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Abstract: This paper investigates the interlinkage in the business cycles based on
sunspot fluctuations of large-country economies in a free-trade equilibrium. We consider a
two-country, two-good, two-factor general equilibrium model with Cobb-Douglas technolo-
gies, sector-specific externalities and linear preferences. We also assume constant social
returns in the investment good sector but decreasing social returns in the consumption
good sector. We first identify the determinants of each country’s accumulation pattern
in autarky equilibrium, and second we show that some country’s sunspot fluctuations
may spread throughout the world once trade opens even if the other country has deter-
minacy under autarky. We thus prove that under free-trade, globalization and market
integration may have destabilizing effects on a country’s competitive equilibrium. Finally,
we characterize a configuration in which opening to international trade improves the
stationary welfare at the world level but deteriorates the stationary welfare of the country
which imports investment goods and exports consumption goods. We thus show that in
opposition to the standard belief, international trade may not be beneficial to all trading
partners in the long run. Moreover, we prove that for some country, international trade
may have contrasted consequences as it may at the same time improve the stationary
welfare and have a destabilizing effect.
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Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, E32, F11, F43, O41.
2
1 Introduction
Globalization and market integration are two important characteristics of
modern developed economies. While these features are often seen as benefi-
cial to growth, one may wonder about the stabilizing or destabilizing effects
of an increased international mobility of produced goods and productive fac-
tors. International trade interlinks the business cycles of trading countries,
as it relates economic activities of agents in one country to those in another.
As a result, a country’s business cycles may be spread throughout the world
or erased.
This paper investigates the dynamic behavior of multiple countries’ eco-
nomic activities in a two-good (consumption and investment), two-factor
(capital and labor) model in which capital is freely mobile between countries
once trade opens whereas labor is internationally immobile. We consider a
discrete-time perfect foresight general equilibrium model with two countries
characterized by asymmetric Cobb-Douglas technologies containing sector-
specific externalities and linear preferences. As well-known since Woodford
[14], local indeterminacy of equilibria, derived for instance from external
effects in production, is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of sunspot
fluctuations. Our aim in then is to study how macroeconomic volatility
based on sunspot fluctuations may spread all over the world through inter-
national trade.
The recent macroeconomics literature has shown that local indetermi-
nacy of equilibria and sunspot fluctuations easily arise in closed economy
two-sector models with sector specific externalities.1 Under certain condi-
tions in terms of factor intensities and provided the elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution in consumption is large enough, there are indeed multiple
equilibrium paths starting from the same initial stock of capital. Consid-
ering the same type of model but under the assumption of a small-open
economy, it has been shown that local indeterminacy arises under the same
basic conditions on the technological side but without any restriction on
preferences.2 However, the consideration of closed economies or small-open
economies, i.e. with a constant exogenous interest rate, prevents from taking
into account the effects of final goods and inputs international mobility on
1See for instance Benhabib and Nishimura [2], Benhabib, Nishimura and Venditti [3].
2See for instance Meng and Velasco [7], Weder [13].
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the stability properties of competitive equilibria. Our aim is thus to under-
stand under what conditions perfect foresight equilibrium path may exhibit
sunspot fluctuations in a large-country trade model.
It is well-known since the contributions of Becker [1], Bewley [4], Epstein
[5] and Yano [15, 16] that in a perfect foresight model with many consumers
or countries, a competitive equilibrium path behaves like an optimal growth
path. Building on this property, Nishimura and Yano [11] have shown that
a country’s business cycles (i.e. two-period cycles) may spread throughout
the world once trade opens. Considering a pecialization of this model to the
case of Cobb-Douglas technologies, Nishimura, Venditti and Yano [10] have
recently provided factor intensities conditions for this result to hold.
In this paper we extend the formulation of Nishimura, Venditti and Yano
[10] by considering Cobb-Douglas technologies augmented to include sector-
specific externalities in both countries. We consider a market integration
in which international trade concerns consumption and investment goods.
In order to characterize the stability properties of free-trade equilibrium
paths, we assume decreasing social returns to scale in the consumption good
sector of each country. Such an assumption is indeed necessary to get a non-
degenerate social production function at the world level. Our main objective
is to identify the capital intensities restrictions in each country to get sunspot
fluctuations along free-trade competitive equilibria.
Assuming a linear utility function in each country, we first prove that
although we consider sector-specific externalities, the free-trade equilibrium
path behaves like the solution of a pseudo planner problem in which the
external effects are considered as given. We then show that for a stationary
capital stock at the world level, two types of stationary distributions across
countries may occur: an autarky distribution in which each country exactly
produces in the long run the amount of capital necessary to produce both
goods but trades with the other country along the transition path, and a
free-trade distribution in which one country is characterized by net exports
in capital and net imports in consumption while the other is characterized
by net imports in capital and net exports in consumption.
Then we analyze the local stability properties of each type of stationary
distribution. We start by providing factor intensities conditions for the oc-
curence of local indeterminacy in a closed-economy under decreasing social
returns. Once international trade opens, focussing first on the autarky dis-
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tribution, we prove that if both countries have locally indeterminate equi-
libria under autarky, then the equilibrium under free-trade is also locally
indeterminate. In this case, the existence of international sunspot fluctua-
tions is derived from the existence of sunspot fluctuations in each country.
Second, building on the same type of arguments, we give factor intensities
conditions for the existence of local indeterminacy along the free-trade dis-
tribution. However, we prove that a continuum of equilibria may occur at
the world level once trade opens even though the capital importing country
is characterized by a saddle-point stable steady state under autarky. In this
case, opening to international trade has a destabilizing effect on the capital
importing country.
Considering finally both the autarky and free-trade distributions, we as-
sume that there is an asymmetry across countries concerning the returns
to scale at the social level and we confirm the potential destabilizing role
of market integration. We show indeed that if in one country the returns
to scale of the consumption good sector are almost constant at the social
level and local indeterminacy holds under autarky, then sunspot fluctuations
occur at the world level even if the equilibrium under autarky in the sec-
ond country is locally determinate. The sunspot fluctuations of one country
then spread throughout the world. For the free-trade distribution, assum-
ing that the capital importing country is characterized by almost constant
social returns to scale, we then derive, in opposition to the previous case,
that opening to international trade has a destabilizing effect on the capital
exporting country.
We also provide a welfare analysis at the steady state by comparing
the stationary amount of consumption obtained in each country under free-
trade with the one obtained under autarky. We characterize a configuration
in which opening to international trade improves the stationary welfare at
the world level but deteriorates the stationary welfare of the country which
imports investment goods and exports consumption goods. We thus show
that in opposition to the standard belief, international trade may not be
beneficial to all trading partners in the long run. Moreover, we prove that
for some country, international trade may have contrasted consequences as it
may at the same time improve the stationary welfare and have a destabilizing
effect.
Our main conclusions can be compared to three recent contributions
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dealing with the existence of local indeterminacy in large-country trade
models. In Nishimura and Shimomura [9], sector-specific externalities are
introduced in a continuous-time version of the Hecksher-Ohlin two-country
dynamic general equilibrium model with Cobb-Douglas technologies. They
show that if in both countries indeterminacy of the equilibrium path holds
under autarky then local indeterminacy also holds in the world market once
trade opens. The same basic framework is also used by Sim and Ho [12]
except that they break the symmetry in which externalities enter the pro-
duction function in the two countries. Assuming that under autarky inde-
terminacy holds in one country but determinacy in the other, they show that
trade can easily overturn indeterminacy. A limitation of these two papers is
that the factors of production are assumed to be internationally immobile.
Ghiglino [6] considers a two-country, two-sector model with labor-
augmenting global externalities. He assumes that both countries have the
same sectoral production functions, the consumption good being produced
with a Cobb-Douglas technology while the investment good is produced
with a Leontief technology. He studies the consequences of market integra-
tion through international trade on the occurrence of sunspot fluctuations.
He shows that provided the inverse of relative risk aversion is not a lin-
ear or concave function, the equilibrium under free-trade may be locally
indeterminate even if the equilibrium under full autarky is determinate. A
limitation of this paper, beside the restriction to a zero elasticity of capital-
labor substitution in the investment good sector, is that as soon as standard
CES preferences are considered (a case in which the inverse of relative risk
aversion is linear), market integration plays no role on the occurrence of
indeterminacy.
This paper is organized as follows: The next Section sets up the basic
model. In Section 3 we study the stability properties of the competitive equi-
librium path in closed economies under decreasing social returns. Section
4 provides the main results on the existence of sunspot fluctuations within
open economies under free-trade. Section 5 contains concluding comments.
All the proofs are gathered in a final Appendix.
4
2 The model
We consider a perfect foresight trade model with two countries, two factors
and two goods. Each country i = A,B is characterized by an infinitely-lived
representative agent with single period linear utility function:
Assumption 1. u(ci) = ci with ci the consumption level of country i =
A,B.
We assume that the labor supply is inelastic. The consumption good, xi, and
the investment good, ki, are assumed to be produced with Cobb-Douglas
technologies which contain some positive sector-specific externalities. We
denote by xi and yi the outputs of sectors ci and ki, and by eic and e
i
y the
corresponding external effects. The private production functions are thus:
xi = E ic(Kic)α
i
1(Lic)
αi2eic, y
i = E iy(Kiy)β
i
1(Liy)
βi2eiy
with E ic, E iy > 0 some normalization constants. The externalities eic and eiy
depend on K¯ij and L¯
i
j , which denote the average use of capital and labor in
sector j = c, y of country i = A,B, and will be equal to
eic = (K¯
i
c)
ai1(L¯ic)
ai2 , eiy = (K¯
i
y)
bi1(L¯iy)
bi2 (1)
with ain, b
i
n ≥ 0, n = 1, 2. We assume that these economy-wide averages
are taken as given by individual firms. At the equilibrium, all firms of
sector i = c, y being identical, we have K¯ij = K
i
j and L¯
i
j = L
i
j . Denoting
αˆin = α
i
n + a
i
n, βˆ
i
n = β
i
n + b
i
n, the social production functions are defined as
xi = E ic(Kic)αˆ
i
1(Lic)
αˆi2 , yi = E iy(Kiy)βˆ
i
1(Liy)
βˆi2 (2)
We assume constant social returns to scale in the investment good sector
but decreasing social returns to scale in the consumption good sector, i.e.
βˆi1 + βˆ
i
2 = 1, αˆ
i
1 + αˆ
i
2 < 1. The returns to scale are therefore decreasing at
the private level.3
3A possible interpretation of decreasing private returns would be to assume the exis-
tence of a factor in fixed supply such as land in the technology, namely
xi = Eic(Kic)α
i
1(Lic)
αi2eic(Lic)1−α
i
1−αi2 , yi = Eiy(Kiy)β
i
1(Liy)
βi2eiy(Liy)1−β
i
1−βi2
Private returns to scale are therefore constant when considering this factor but decreasing
with respect to capital and labor. In such a case, the income of the representative consumer
is increased by the rental rate of land. Our formulation implicitely assumes a normalization
Lic = Liy = 1.
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Labor is normalized to one, Lic+L
i
y = 1, and the total stock of capital in
country i is given by Kic+K
i
y = k
i. Goods xi and ki are assumed to be freely
mobile between countries once trade opens, whereas labor is internationally
immobile both before and after the opening of trade. Assuming that capital
fully depreciates at each period, it follows that along a free-trade equilibrium,
the market clearing conditions for goods xi and ki are as:
cAt + c
B
t = x
A
t + x
B
t , k
A
t+1 + k
B
t+1 = y
A
t + y
B
t (3)
On the contrary along an autarky equilibrium, the market clearing condi-
tions become
cit = x
i
t, k
i
t+1 = y
i
t (4)
In each country, the optimal allocation of factors across sectors is ob-
tained by solving the following program:
max
Kict,L
i
ct,K
i
yt,L
i
yt
E ic(Kict)α
i
1(Lict)
αi2eict
s.t. yit = E iy(Kiyt)β
i
1(Liyt)
βi2eiyt
1 = Lict + L
i
yt
kit = K
i
ct +K
i
yt
eict, e
i
yt given
(5)
Denote by qit, p
i
t, ω
i
t and r
i
t respectively the prices of the consumption
good and the capital good, the wage rate of labor and the rental rate of the
capital good at time t. In the case in which the countries do not trade with
each other (autarky case), the prices are generally different between coun-
tries. On the contrary, in a free-trade equilibrium, prices must be equated
between countries, so that qAt = q
B
t , p
A
t = p
B
t and r
A
t = r
B
t must hold. How-
ever, because labor is immobile across countries, ωit might differ between
countries even in the free-trade case. In the following we will choose the con-
sumption good as numeraire and thus adopt the normalization qAt = q
B
t = 1.
The Lagrangian corresponding to program (5) is:
Lt = E ic(Kict)α
i
1(Lict)
αi2eict + p
i
t
(
E iy(Kiyt)β
i
1(Liyt)
βi2eiyt − yit
)
+ ωit(1− Lict − Liyt) + rit(kit −Kict −Kiyt)
(6)
For any given (kit, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt), solving the first order conditions gives input
demand functions K˜ic = K
i
c(k
i
t, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt), L˜
i
c = L
i
c(k
i
t, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt), K˜
i
y =
Kiy(k
i
t, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt) and L˜
i
y = L
i
y(k
i
t, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt). We may thus define the social
production function of country i as:
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T i(kit, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt) = E icK˜ic(kit, yit, eict, eiyt)α
i
1L˜ic(k
i
t, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt)
αi2eict (7)
Using the envelope theorem we derive the equilibrium prices:
rit = T
i
1(k
i
t, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt), p
i
t = −T i2(kit, yit, eict, eiyt) (8)
where T i1 = ∂T
i/∂ki and T i2 = ∂T
i/∂yi.4
3 Closed economy under decreasing returns
In a closed economy the equilibrium is derived from the following optimiza-
tion program:
max
yit
+∞∑
t=0
ρtT i(kit, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt)
s.t. kit+1 = y
i
t
ki0, e
i
ct, e
i
yt given
with ρ ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor. The corresponding Euler equation is
thus
T i2(k
i
t, k
i
t+1, e
i
ct, e
i
yt) + ρT
i
1(k
i
t+1, k
i
t+2, e
i
ct+1, e
i
yt+1) = 0 (9)
From the input demand functions together with the external effects (1)
considered at the equilibrium we may define the equilibrium factors de-
mand fonctions Kˆj = Kˆj(ki, yi), Lˆj = Lˆj(ki, yi) so that eˆic = eˆ
i
c(k
i, yi) =
E ic(Kˆic)a
i
1(Lˆic)
ai2 and eˆiy = eˆ
i
y(k
i, yi) = (Kˆiy)
bi1(Lˆiy)
bi2 . From (8) prices now
satisfy
ri(kit, k
i
t+1) = T
i
1(k
i
t, k
i
t+1, eˆ
i
c(k
i
t, k
i
t+1), eˆ
i
y(k
i
t, k
i
t+1))
pi(kit, k
i
t+1) = −T i2(kit, kit+1, , eˆic(kit, kit+1), eˆiy(kit, kit+1))
(10)
We then get equation (9) evaluated at eˆic and eˆ
i
y:
−pi(kit, kit+1) + ρri(kit+1, kit+2) (11)
Any solution {kit}+∞t=0 which also satisfies the transversality condition
4Since the private technologies exhibit decreasing returns to scale, the competitive
firms earn positive profits that have to be distributed back to the households who own
physical capital. It can be shown as in Mino [8] that solving a peudo-planning problem in
which the planner maximizes the discounted sum of utilities, under free-trade or autarky,
subject to the social production function (7) and the market clearing conditions (3) or
(4), is equivalent to solving a decentralized problem in which the households maximize a
discounted sum of utilitites subject to some budget constraint based on given sequences
of prices and the distributed profits.
7
lim
t→+∞ ρ
tpi(kit, k
i
t+1)k
i
t+1 = 0
is called a closed economy equilibrium path.
A closed-economy steady state is defined by kit = k
i
t+1 = y
i
t = k¯
i and is
given by the solving of −pi(ki, ki) + ρri(ki, ki) = 0.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique closed-economy steady state k¯i for
country i such that:
k¯i = α
i
1β
i
2(Eiyρβi1)1/βˆ
i
2
αi2β
i
1+(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)ρβi1
(12)
Moreover, the stationary optimal demand for capital in the investment good
sector is given by Ki∗y ≡ gi = ρβi1y¯i = ρβi1k¯i
Consider the following notations
T im1(ki, yi) = ∂Tm(ki, yi, eˆic(ki, yi), eˆiy(ki, yi))/∂ki
T im2(ki, yi) = ∂Tm(ki, yi, eˆic(ki, yi), eˆiy(ki, yi))/∂yi
for m = 1, 2. The linearization of the Euler equation around k¯i gives the
following characteristic polynomial for the closed economy case:
P ic(λ) = ρT i12(k¯i, k¯i)λ2 + λ
[
T i22(k¯i, k¯i) + ρT i11(k¯i, k¯i)
]
+ T i21(k¯i, k¯i) = 0 (13)
As usual with Cobb-Douglas technologies, factor intensities at the private
and social levels may be determined by the shares of input into production.5
Lemma 1. The consumption (investment) good sector of country i is capital
intensive at the private level if and only if αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1 > (<)0 while it is
capital intensive at the social level if and only if αˆi1βˆ
i
2 − αˆi2βˆi1 > (<)0.
We may now give conditions for the existence of local indeterminacy.
Proposition 2. In country i, let the consumption good be capital intensive
at the private level with
αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1 > αi2 + 2(1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2)αi1βi2(1+βˆi1)
[2(1−αˆi1)−βˆi2](1−βi1)
(14)
If one of the following sets of conditions is satisfied:
i) βˆi1 − αˆi1 > 0,
ii) 1− αˆi1 > αˆi1 − βˆi1 > (1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2)βˆi1αi1βi2
αi2(1−βi1)
,
then there exists ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that the closed-economy steady state k¯i is
locally indeterminate for any ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1).
5See Benhabib, Nishimura and Venditti [3].
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Condition (14) shows that the capital intensity difference at the private level
needs to be large enough to compensate the degree of decreasing returns in
the consumption good sector. Notice that condition i) implies that the
consumption good is labor intensive at the social level while condition ii)
can be satisfied even if the consumption good is also capital intensive at the
social level.
4 Open economy under free-trade
Denote by λi, i = A,B, the country i’s marginal utility of wealth associated
with the free-trade equilibrium. It is standard since Bewley [4] to normalize
the price paths so that marginal utilities of wealth add up to a constant
value. To simplify the formulation it is convenient to adopt as in Nishimura
and Yano [11] the normalization
λA + λB = 2 (15)
Given λ = (λA, λB), let us define
W (kt, yt, ect, eyt;λ) = max
cAt ,c
B
t ,k
A
t ,k
B
t ,y
A
t ,y
B
t
u(cAt )
λA
+ u(c
B
t )
λB
s.t. cAt + c
B
t ≤ TA(kAt , yAt , eAct, eAyt)
+ TB(kBt , y
B
t , e
B
ct, e
B
yt)
kAt + k
B
t ≤ kt
yAt + y
B
t ≤ yt
ect, eyt given
with ect = (eAct, e
B
ct) and eyt = (e
A
yt, e
B
yt). Stated that way, the dynamical
properties of a free-trade equilibrium path depend on marginal utilities of
wealth λ = (λA, λB) which are endogenous variables. However, under the
assumption of linear utility functions, we can show that along a free-trade
equilibrium path, the marginal utilities of wealth λA and λB are equal so
that the following result holds:6
Proposition 3. Consider the following value function:
6Although we consider productive externalities, assuming linear utility functions allows
to get the same result as in Nishimura and Yano [11].
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V (kt, yt, ect, eyt) = max
kAt ,k
B
t ,y
A
t ,y
B
t
TA(kAt , y
A
t , e
A
ct, e
A
yt) + T
B(kBt , y
B
t , e
B
ct, e
B
yt)
s.t. kAt + k
B
t ≤ kt
yAt + y
B
t ≤ yt
ect, eyt given
Under Assumption 1 and the normalization (15), the marginal utilities of
wealth satisfy λA = λB = 1 and V (kt, yt, ect, eyt) =W (kt, yt, ect, eyt;λ).
A free-trade equilibrium may then be interpreted as an equilibrium path
with respect to the linear world welfare function as defined in Proposition
3. The corresponding first order conditions give:
TA1 (k
A
t , y
A
t , e
A
ct, e
A
yt)− TB1 (kBt , yBt , eBct, eByt) = 0
TA2 (k
A
t , y
A
t , e
A
ct, e
A
yt)− TB2 (kBt , yBt , eBct, eByt) = 0
(16)
The intertemporal free-trade equilibrium is finally derived from the following
optimization:
max
yt
+∞∑
t=0
ρtV (kt, yt, ect, eyt)
s.t. kt+1 = yt
k0 = kA0 + k
B
0 , ect, eyt given
The corresponding Euler equation is thus
V2(kt, kt+1, ect, eyt) + ρV1(kt+1, kt+2, ect+1, eyt+1) = 0
From the first order conditions (16), the envelope theorem gives
V1(kt, yt, ect, eyt) = TB1 (k
B
t , y
B
t , e
B
ct, e
B
yt) = T
A
1 (k
A
t , y
A
t , e
A
ct, e
A
yt)
V2(kt, yt, ect, eyt) = TB2 (k
B
t , y
B
t , e
B
ct, e
B
yt) = T
A
2 (k
A
t , y
A
t , e
A
ct, e
A
yt)
and the Euler equation becomes
TB2 (k
B
t , y
B
t , e
B
ct, e
B
yt) + ρT
B
1 (k
B
t+1, y
B
t+1, e
B
ct+1, e
B
yt+1)
= TA2 (k
A
t , y
A
t , e
A
ct, e
A
yt) + ρT
A
1 (k
A
t+1, y
A
t+1, e
A
ct+1, e
A
yt+1) = 0
(17)
Solving equations (16) with the sector-specific externalities (1) considered
at the equilibrium and given in Section 3, namely eˆic = eˆ
i
c(k
i, yi) and
eˆiy = eˆ
i
y(k
i, yi), we derive kˆi = kˆi(k, y), yˆi = yˆi(k, y) and thus eˆc(k, y) =
(eˆAc (kˆ
A, yˆA), eˆBc (kˆ
B, yˆB)), eˆy(k, y) = (eˆAy (kˆ
A, yˆA), eˆBy (kˆ
B, yˆB)). The Euler
equation evaluated at the equilibrium finally becomes
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V2(kt, kt+1, eˆc(kt, kt+1), eˆy(kt, kt+1))
+ ρV1(kt+1, kt+2, eˆc(kt+1, kt+2), eˆy(kt+1, kt+2)) = 0
Any solution {kt}+∞t=0 which also satisfies the transversality condition
lim
t→+∞ ρ
tV2(kt, kt+1, eˆc(kt, kt+1), eˆy(kt, kt+1))kt+1 = 0
is called a free-trade equilibrium path.
Let us denote k∗ the steady state solution of
V2(k, k, eˆc(k, k), eˆy(k, k)) + ρV1(k, k, eˆc(k, k), eˆy(k, k)) = 0 (18)
The steady state k∗ gives a total stationary amount of capital at the world
level. Contrary to the closed-economy case, an explicit computation of k∗
cannot be derived from (18). Moreover, the distribution across the two
countries remains to be determined.
4.1 Stationary distributions
The Euler equation along a free-trade equilibrium (17), when compared with
the Euler equation along a closed-economy equilibrium (9), clearly shows
that different types of distributions are compatible with a total stationary
stock of capital at the world level k∗. In particular, an autarky distribution
in which each country exactly produces in the long run the amount of capital
necessary to produce the consumption and investment goods may occur,
i.e. ki = yi. Consider indeed the closed-economy steady state given in
Proposition 1 for each country, i.e. k¯A and k¯B. Using the normalization
constants E ic, we can show that k¯ = k¯A + k¯B is also a steady state of the
open economy under free-trade:
Proposition 4. Let EAy = EBc = EBy = 1 and consider k¯i, i = A,B, as
given in Proposition 1. Then there exists E¯Ac > 0 such that the autarky
distribution k¯ = k¯A + k¯B is a solution of equation (18), i.e., k¯ = k∗, if and
only if EAc = E¯Ac .
The corresponding amount of stationary consumptions under this capital
distribution immediately derives from (7) as
c¯i = T i(k¯i, k¯i, eˆic(k¯
i, k¯i), eˆiy(k¯
i, k¯i)) ≡ T¯ i (19)
Notice that considering the autarky distribution does not imply that
countries do not trade. They may actually trade during the transition
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dynamics while the long run equilibrium is characterized by autarky.
We have also to consider the possible existence of a free-trade distribution
such that k∗ = kA∗+kB∗ in which one country, say A, is characterized by net
imports of capital, i.e. kA∗ > yA∗, while country B is characterized by net
exports of capital, i.e. kB∗ < yB∗. Proceeding as in Proposition 4, we can
use the normalization constants E ic and E iy to prove that such a free-trade
distribution exists. We actually focus on a particular solution such that
kA∗ = θyA∗ > yA∗ and kB∗ = yB∗/θ < yB∗ with θ > 1 a given constant.
Proposition 5. Let EBc = EBy = 1 and consider a constant θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ).
Then there exist EA∗c > 0 and EA∗y > 0 such that the free-trade distribution
k∗ = kA∗ + kB∗ = θyA∗ + yB∗/θ with
kA∗ = θα
A
1 β
A
2 (EAy ρβA1 )1/βˆ
A
2
αA2 β
A
1 θ+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1
, kB∗ = α
B
1 β
B
2 (ρβ
B
1 )
1/βˆB2
αB2 β
B
1 +(α
B
1 β
B
2 −αB2 βA1 )ρβB1 θ
(20)
is a solution of equation (18) if and only if EAc = EA∗c and EAy = EA∗y .
We have now to compute the stationary consumption levels associated
with this distribution of capital. At the free-trade steady state with θ ∈
(1, 1/ρβB1 ), the country i’s production of the consumption good is derived
from (7) as:
T i∗ = T i(ki∗, ki∗, eˆic(k
i∗, ki∗), eˆiy(k
i∗, ki∗))
We know that country A imports capital goods while country B exports
capital goods, namely
MAy = (θ − 1)yA∗, XBy =
(
θ−1
θ
)
yB∗
In order to have a balance of trade in equilibrium, we derive from this that
country A has to export consumption goods while country B has to import
consumption goods. Let η > 1 and consider the following distribution of
consumption across the two countries
cA∗ = T
A∗
η < T
A∗, cB∗ = ηTB∗ > TB∗
It follows that
XAc =
(
η−1
η
)
TA∗, MBc = (η − 1)TB∗
Therefore, the balance of trade is in equilibrium in each country if
NXA = XAc − pMAy = 0, NXB = pXBy −MBc = 0
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or equivalently
(θ − 1)pyA∗ =
(
η−1
η
)
TA∗(
θ−1
θ
)
pyB∗ = (η − 1)TB∗
with p the relative price of the investment good. Taking the ratio of these
expressions yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Let EBc = EBy = 1 and EA∗c > 0, EA∗y > 0 as given by Propo-
sition 5. Consider θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ) and the free-trade distribution of capital
as given by (20), and assume that αB1 (θ − ρβA1 )/αA1 (1 − ρβB1 θ) > 1. Then
the associated free-trade distribution of consumption is c∗ = cA∗ + cB∗ =
TA∗/η + ηTB∗ with η = TA∗/TB∗ = αB1 (θ − ρβA1 )/αA1 (1− ρβB1 θ) and
cA∗ = TB∗, cB∗ = TA∗ (21)
It is worth noticing that the autarky and free-trade distributions cannot
co-exist since they are respectively associated with different values for the
normalization constants E ic, E iy.7
4.2 Characteristic polynomial
The linearization of the Euler equation around k∗ requires the computations
of the partial derivatives of Vm(k, y, eˆc(k, y), eˆy(k, y)). Let us denote
Vm1(k, y) = ∂Vm(k, y, eˆc(k, y), eˆy(k, y))/∂k
Vm2(k, y) = ∂Vm(k, y, eˆc(k, y), eˆy(k, y))/∂y
for m = 1, 2. At a steady state under free-trade, we have y = k and
the characteristic polynomial for the open economy case may be written as
follows:
Po(λ) = ρV12(k∗, k∗)λ2+λ
[
V22(k∗, k∗)+ρV11(k∗, k∗)
]
+V21(k∗, k∗) = 0 (22)
We may now provide a detailed stability analysis of the two possible distri-
butions of the stationary capital stock k∗ across countries.
7See Appendix 6.4 and 6.5 for detailed expressions.
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4.3 Sunspot fluctuations under free-trade
We focus on local stability results when the consumption good is capital
intensive at the private level. As in the closed economy case, such a capital
intensity configuration is a necessary condition for the existence of local inde-
terminacy and sunspot fluctuations.8 In a first step we study the properties
of equilibrium paths at the world level around the autarky distribution.
Proposition 6. Let EAy = EBc = EBy = 1, EAc = E¯Ac , and consider the
autarky distribution as defined in Proposition 4. In each country i = A,B,
let the consumption good be capital intensive at the private level with
αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1 > αi2 + 2(1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2)αi1βi2(1+βˆi1)
[2(1−αˆi1)−βˆi2](1−βi1)
(23)
If in each country i = A,B one of the following sets of conditions is satisfied:
i) βˆi1 − αˆi1 > 0,
ii) 1− αˆi1 > αˆi1 − βˆi1 > (1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2)βˆi1αi1βi2
αi2(1−βi1)
,
then there exists ρˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that the autarky steady state k∗ = k¯ =
k¯A + k¯B is locally indeterminate for any ρ ∈ (ρˆ, 1).
Considering Proposition 2, Proposition 6 implies that if both countries have
locally indeterminate equilibria under autarky, then the equilibrium under
free-trade is also locally indeterminate. Put differently, a market integration,
in which international trade concerns consumption and investment goods,
does not rule out sunspot fluctuations that may exist under autarky. This
result is similar to the main conclusion of Nishimura and Shimomura [9]
except that we consider a discrete-time model and we assume perfect inter-
national mobility of capital across countries.
We may also derive conditions for local indeterminacy of the free-trade
steady state as defined by Proposition 5
Proposition 7. Let EBc = EBy = 1, EAc = EA∗c , EAy = EA∗y , θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ),
and consider the free-trade distribution k∗ = kA∗+ kB∗ as defined by Propo-
sition 5. Assume also that in each country i = A,B, the consumption good
is capital intensive at the private level with
αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > αA2 + 2(1−αˆ
A
1 −αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 θ(1+βˆA1 )
[2(1−αˆA1 )−βˆA2 ](θ−βA1 )
(24)
8See Benhabib, Nishimura and Venditti [3].
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and
αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 > αB2 + 2(1−αˆ
B
1 −αˆB2 )αB1 βB2 (1+θβˆB1 )
[2(1−αˆB1 )−βˆB2 ](1−θβB1 )
(25)
If one of the following sets of conditions is satisfied:
i) βˆA1 − αˆA1 > 0 and βˆB1 − αˆB1 > 0,
ii) 1 − αˆA1 > αˆA1 − βˆA1 > (1−αˆ
A
1 −αˆA2 )βˆA1 αA1 βA2
αA2 (θ−βA1 )
and 1 − αˆB1 > αˆB1 − βˆB1 >
(1−αˆB1 −αˆB2 )βˆB1 αB1 βB2 θ
αB2 (1−θβB1 )
,
then there exists ρˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that the free-trade steady state k∗ = kA∗+kB∗
is locally indeterminate for any ρ ∈ (ρˆ, 1).
Proposition 7 provides conditions on the technologies of both countries for
the existence of sunspot fluctuations at the free-trade steady state which are
similar to those given in Proposition 6. However, notice that for country A
condition (24) in Proposition 7 may hold while condition (23) in Proposition
6 does not, whereas for country B condition (25) implies condition (23).
As a result, we show with the following Corollary that opening to free-
trade an economy, which is saddle-point stable under autarky, may have a
destabilizing effect.
Corollary 2. Let EBc = EBy = 1, EAc = EA∗c , EAy = EA∗y , θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ), and
consider the free-trade distribution k∗ = kA∗+kB∗ as defined by Proposition
5. Assume also that in each country i = A,B, the consumption good is
capital intensive at the private level with
αA2 +
2(1−αˆA1 −αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 (1+βˆA1 )
[2(1−αˆA1 )−βˆA2 ](1−βA1 )
> αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > αA2 + 2(1−αˆ
A
1 −αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 θ(1+βˆA1 )
[2(1−αˆA1 )−βˆA2 ](θ−βA1 )
and
αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 > αB2 + 2(1−αˆ
B
1 −αˆB2 )αB1 βB2 (1+θβˆB1 )
[2(1−αˆB1 )−βˆB2 ](1−θβB1 )
If one of the following sets of conditions is satisfied:
i) βˆA1 − αˆA1 > 0 and βˆB1 − αˆB1 > 0,
ii) 1 − αˆA1 > αˆA1 − βˆA1 > (1−αˆ
A
1 −αˆA2 )βˆA1 αA1 βA2
αA2 (θ−βA1 )
and 1 − αˆB1 > αˆB1 − βˆB1 >
(1−αˆB1 −αˆB2 )βˆB1 αB1 βB2 θ
αB2 (1−θβB1 )
,
then there exists ρˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that the free-trade steady state k∗ = kA∗ +
kB∗ is locally indeterminate for any ρ ∈ (ρˆ, 1) while the steady state under
autarky in economy A is saddle-point stable.
In a last step we study the properties of equilibrium paths around a
steady state k∗ which may be indifferently characterized by an autarky or
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free-trade distribution as defined by Propositions 4 and 5. We assume now
that there is an asymmetry across sectors concerning the returns to scale
at the social level in the final good sector. We will confirm the potential
destabilizing role of market integration. Let us introduce for country i =
A,B the following parameter
ic = 1− αˆi1 − αˆi2
Constant social returns to scale in the consumption good sector are clearly
obtained when ic = 0. On the contrary, decreasing social returns are associ-
ated with ic > 0. We say that the consumption good technology of country
i has almost constant social returns if ic is sufficiently small.
We may then provide simple conditions for the existence of local inde-
terminacy if one country, say country A, is characterized by a consumption
good technology with almost constant social returns.
Proposition 8. Let the consumption good in country A be capital intensive
at the private level with αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > αA2 . Then there exist  > 0
and ρ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any Ac ∈ [0, ) and Bc > 0, a steady state
k∗ = kA∗ + kB∗ is locally indeterminate when ρ ∈ (ρ∗, 1) if one of the
following sets of conditions is satisfied:
i) the consumption good in country A is labor intensive at the social level,
ii) the consumption good in country A is also capital intensive at the
social level with αˆA1 − βˆA1 ∈ (0, αˆA2 ).
Proposition 8 shows that the occurrence of sunspot fluctuations at the world
level is only based on the existence of sunspot fluctuations in country A
and may be obtained even if in country B the equilibrium path is locally
determinate. A market integration may then have destabilizing effects for
some countries if the trade agreement is made with a country characterized
by constant returns at the social level and local indeterminacy.
Remark 1: Sim and Ho [12] provide some opposite result to Proposition
8 within a continuous-time model derived from Nishimura and Shimomura
[9]. Breaking the symmetry in which externalities enter the production
function in the two countries, they show indeed that indeterminacy may arise
under autarky while uniqueness is the true outcome given trade. The main
difference with our model concerns the fact that they assume internationally
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immobile capital and labor.
Remark 2: Ghiglino [6] provides results similar to Corollary 2 and Propo-
sition 8 but using a different type of argument. He considers a two-country,
two-sector model in which the consumption good is produced with a Cobb-
Douglas technology while the investment good is produced with a Leontief
technology. Both production functions contain labor-augmenting global ex-
ternalities. He studies the consequences of an increased size of the market
following an international trade agreement on the occurrence of sunspot
fluctuations. Indeed, when some country opens to trade, the steady state
corresponding to the new integrated market and thus the stationary value
of the inverse of relative risk aversion are modified. In the case in which this
function is strictly concave, Ghiglino then shows that the equilibrium under
free-trade may be locally indeterminate even if the equilibrium under full
autarky is determinate. A limitation of this paper is that strict concavity
of the inverse of relative risk aversion involves restrictions on the third and
fourth derivatives of the utility function which are not limited by standard
assumptions on preferences. Moreover, as soon as CES preferences are con-
sidered, market integration plays no role on the occurrence of indeterminacy.
The main difference with our results is that our methodology is not based
on the size of the integrated market per se but on some direct conditions on
the technologies.
4.4 Some comments on welfare properties of steady states
Since Ricardo, free-trade and market integration are often seen as beneficial
for all trading partners. In order to have a precise evaluation of this claim,
the key point is to determine whether or not an economy may increase
its welfare by opening to international trade. In our intertemporal general
equilibrium model, since we assume linear utility functions in both countries,
the stationay welfare of each country can be directly evaluated by looking
at the amount of consumption at the steady state. Obviously, if the steady
state under free-trade corresponds to the autarky distribution, then opening
to international trade does not affect the stationary welfare. However, if the
free-trade distribution is reached after the market integration, then one may
expect a modification of the stationary welfare of both countries.
As shown by Corollary 1, the stationary amount of consumption as-
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sociated with the free-trade distribution defined from the parameter θ ∈
(1, 1/ρβB1 ) is such that:
cA∗ = TB∗ and cB∗ = TA∗
In order to compare the consumption levels under free-trade to those ob-
tained in the closed-economy case we have to consider the normalization
constants EBc = EBy = 1, EAc = EA∗c and EAy = EA∗y as given in Proposition 5.
Using these values, we may compute from (19) the corresponding amount
of stationary consumptions under autarky
c¯i = T¯ i
From these expressions we also compute the welfare at the world level under
autarky, i.e., W¯ ≡ c¯A + c¯B, and under free-trade, i.e., W∗ ≡ cA∗ + cB∗. We
then provide a configuration in which, in opposition to the standard belief,
international trade may not be beneficial to all trading partners. :
Proposition 9. Let EBc = EBy = 1, EAc = EA∗c , EAy = EA∗y as given in
Proposition 5, and θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ). Then there exists θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ) such
that for any θ ∈ (θ, 1/ρβB1 ), W∗ > W¯ while cA∗ < c¯A, i.e. opening to
international trade improves the stationary welfare at the world level but
deteriorates the stationary welfare of country A which imports capital and
exports consumption.
The basic intuition for this result is the following: country B, by exporting
capital, decreases the production in both sectors, in particular in the con-
sumption good sector. The equilibrium of the balance of trade then implies
that country B imports consumption. When θ is large, i.e. the amount
of country B’s capital exports is large, the corresponding amount of con-
sumption imports increases dramatically. As a consequence, the amount of
country A’s consumption exports may become larger than the additional
production of consumption obtained from the capital imports. As a result,
the amount of consumption and thus the stationary welfare of country A
are decreased under free-trade.
On the basis of Proposition 9, we may derive relationships between the
welfare loss and the destabilizing effects of international trade. Considering
first Corollary 2, we conclude that opening to international trade has at
the same time a destabilizing effect on country A since sunspot fluctuations
are imported from country B and deteriorates its stationary welfare by de-
creasing the amount of consumption at the steady state. On the contrary,
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considering Proposition 8 with the free-trade distribution, we conclude that
while opening to international trade has a destabilizing effect on country B
as sunspot fluctuations are imported from country A, it allows to improve
its stationary welfare by increasing the amount of consumption at the steady
state. The occurrence of sunspot fluctuations may be thus compatible with
a greater welfare.
5 Concluding comments
In a perfect foresight model with two countries characterized by Cobb-
Douglas technologies, sector-specific externalities and decreasing returns at
the social level, we have investigated the way sunspot fluctuations of coun-
tries may spread all over the world through international trade.
We have first identified the factor intensities conditions for the existence
of local indeterminacy in a closed economy under decreasing social returns.
Second, we have shown how sunspot fluctuations may occur at the world
level once trade opens. We have studied two types of stationary distributions
across countries compatible with a global stationary capital stock.
Dealing in a first step with the autarky distribution, which is associated
with countries that do not trade in the long run but trade along the transi-
tion path, we have shown that if both countries have locally indeterminate
equilibria under autarky, then local indeterminacy also occurs at the world
equilibrium under free-trade.
In a second step, dealing with the free-trade distribution, we have proved
that a continuum of equilibria may occur at the world level once trade opens
even though the importing country is characterized by a saddle-point stable
steady state under autarky. In this case, we have also shown that opening to
international trade has at the same time a destabilizing effect and decreases
the stationary welfare of the capital importing country.
Considering finally both types of distributions, we have confirmed the
potential destabilizing role of market integration by showing that if one
country has almost constant social retruns to scale in the consumption good
sector and sunspot fluctuations under autarky, then local indeterminacy
arises along a free-trade equilibrium even if local determinacy holds in the
other country. When applied to the free-trade distribution and assuming
that the capital importing country is characterized by almost constant social
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returns to scale, this conclusion implies, in opposition to the previous case,
that while it has a destabilizing effect on the capital exporting country,
opening to international trade allows to increase its stationary welfare.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We start by characterizing the first partial derivatives of T i(ki, yi, eic, e
i
y).
Lemma 6.1. The first partial derivatives of T i(ki, yi, eic, e
i
y) are given by:
T i1(k
i, yi, eic, e
i
y) = E icαi1(αi2βi1/∆i)α
i
2(ki − gi)αi1+αi2−1eic
T i2(k
i, yi, eic, e
i
y) = − E
i
ce
i
cα
i
1
Eiyeiyβi1
(αi2β
i
1/∆
i)α
i
2
(αi1β
i
2/∆
i)
βi
2
(ki − gi)αi1+αi2−1(gi)1−βi1−βi2
= −T i1(ki,yi,eic,eiy)Eiyeiyβi1 (α
i
1β
i
2/∆
i)−βi2(gi)1−βi1−βi2
(26)
where
∆i = αi2β
i
1k
i + (αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1)gi
gi = gi(ki, yi, eic, e
i
y) =
{
Kiy ∈ (0, E iy(ki)β
i
1eiy) / y
i = E
i
ye
i
y(α
i
1β
i
2)
βi2 (Kiy)
βi1+β
i
2
[αi2β
i
1k
i+(αi1β
i
2−αi2βi1)Kiy ]
βi
2
}
Proof : From the Lagrangian (6) we derive the first order conditions:
E icαi1(Kic)α
i
1−1(Lic)α
i
2eic − ri = 0, E icαi2(Kic)α
i
1(Lic)
αi2−1eic − ωi = 0
piβi1E iy(Kiy)β
i
1−1(Liy)β
i
2eiy − ri = 0, piβi2E iy(Kiy)β
i
1(Liy)
βi2−1eiy − ωi = 0
(27)
Using Kic = k
i −Kiy, Liy = 1− Lic, and merging equations (27) we obtain:
Lic =
αi2β
i
1(k
i −Kiy)
(αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1)Kiy + αi2βi1ki
(28)
Liy =
αi1β
i
2K
i
y
(αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1)Kiy + αi2βi1ki
(29)
Kic = k
i −Kiy (30)
Kiy = g
i(ki, yi, eic, e
i
y) ≡ gi (31)
where
gi =
{
Kiy ∈ (0, E iy(ki)β
i
1eiy) / y
i = E
i
ye
i
y(α
i
1β
i
2)
βi2 (Kiy)
βi1+β
i
2
[αi2β
i
1k
i+(αi1β
i
2−αi2βi1)Kiy ]
βi
2
}
(32)
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To simplify notation let:
∆i = αi2β
i
1k
i + (αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1)gi (33)
From (27), (28), (30) we obtain T i1(k
i, yi, eic, e
i
y) and from (27), (29), (31) we
get T i2(k
i, yi, eic, e
i
y).
We may now prove Proposition 1. Using (1) with (28)-(31) we obtain
the sector-specific externalities evaluated at the equilibrium
eic = (k
i − gi)ai1+ai2
(
αi2β
i
1
∆i
)ai2
, eiy = (g
i)b
i
1+b
i
2
(
αi1β
i
2
∆i
)bi2
(34)
Substituting these expressions into (26) and (32) gives:
ri(ki, yi) = E icαi1
(
αi2β
i
1
∆i
)αˆi2
(ki − gi)αˆi1+αˆi2−1
pi(ki, yi) = ri(ki, yi) g
i
βi1y
i
(35)
where gi is now given by
gi = gi(ki, yi) =
{
Kiy ∈ (0, E iy(ki)βˆ
i
1) / yi = E
i
y(α
i
1β
i
2)
βˆi2Kiy
[αi2β
i
1k
i+(αi1β
i
2−αi2βi1)Kiy ]
βˆi
2
}
(36)
The steady state is finally obtained by solving −pi(ki, ki) + ρri(ki, ki) = 0
with y = k.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We first have to characterize the partial derivatives T imn(ki, yi), m,n = 1, 2:
Lemma 6.2. The partial derivatives T imn(ki, yi) are given by:
T i11(ki, yi) = − r
i(ki,yi)
ki−gi
{
(1−αˆi1)αi2βi1(ki−gi)+(1−αˆi1−αˆi2)βˆi1αi1βi2gi
αi2β
i
1k
i+βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)gi
}
T i12(ki, yi) = r
i(ki,yi)ρβi1
ki−gi
{
(1−αˆi1−αˆi2)αi2βi1ki−(αi1βi2−αi2βi1)[αˆi2ki−(1−αˆi1)gi]
αi2β
i
1k
i+βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)gi
}
T i21(ki, yi) = r
i(ki,yi)ρ
ki−gi
{
(βˆi1−αˆi1)αi2βi1(ki−gi)+(1−αˆi1−αˆi2)βˆi1αi1βi2gi
αi2β
i
1k
i+βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)gi
}
T i22(ki, yi) = − r
i(ki,yi)
ki−gi
ρgi
yiβi1
{
(1−αˆi1−αˆi2)αi1βi2ki−(αi1βi2−αi2βi1)[(αˆi2−βˆi2)ki−(βˆi1−αˆi1)gi]
αi2β
i
1k
i+βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)gi
}
and thus
|H i(ki, yi)| = T i11(ki, yi)T i22(ki, yi)− T i12(ki, yi)T i21(ki, yi)
= r
i(ki,yi)2
ki−gi
ρ2βi1βˆ
i
2α
i
1β
i
2(1−αˆi1−αˆi2)
αi2β
i
1k
i+βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)gi
> 0
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Proof : By definition of gi as given by (36), we have the identity:
yi[αi2β
i
1k
i + (αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1)gi]βˆ
i
2 = E iy(αi1βi2)βˆ
i
2gi (37)
Total differentiation gives after simplifications:
yi
gi
dgi[αi2β
i
1k
i + βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2 − αi2βi1)gi] = dyi∆i + βˆi2αi2βi1yidki
We then get
gi1 =
dgi
dki
= βˆ
i
2α
i
2β
i
1g
i
αi2β
i
1k
i+βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)gi
gi2 =
dgi
dyi
= ∆
igi
yi[αi2βi1ki+βˆi1(αi1βi2−αi2βi1)gi]
The partial derivatives T imn(ki, yi) are then obtained by differentiating (35)
taking into account the fact that
gi − yigi2 = gi βˆ
i
2(α
i
2β
i
1−αi1βi2)gi
αi2β
i
1k
i+βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)gi
= gi α
i
2β
i
1−αi1βi2
αi2β
i
1
gi1
1− gi1 = ∆
i−βˆi2αi1βi2gi
αi2β
i
1k
i+βˆi1(α
i
1β
i
2−αi2βi1)gi
We can then compute
|H i(ki, yi)| = T i11(ki, yi)T i22(ki, yi)− T i12(ki, yi)T i21(ki, yi)
We may now prove Proposition 2. Consider the partial derivatives
T imn(ki, yi) evaluated at the autarky steady state with gi = ρβi1y¯i = ρβi1k¯i.
Straightforward computations give after simplifications:
Pic(0)
Ai = (βˆ
i
1 − αˆi1)αi2(1− ρβi1) + (1− αˆi1 − αˆi2)βˆi1αi1βi2ρ
Pic(1)
Ai = −βˆi2(1− ρβi1)
[
αi2 + ρ(α
i
1β
i
2 − αi2βi1)
]
< 0
Pic(−1)
Ai = 2ρ(1− αˆi1 − αˆi2)αi1βi2(1 + βˆi1)
+ [2(1− αˆi1)− βˆi2](1− ρβi1)[αi2 − ρ(αi1βi2 − αi2βi1)]
(38)
with
Ai = T
i
1(k¯
i, k¯i, eˆc(k¯i, k¯i), eˆy(k¯i, k¯i))ρ
k¯i[αi2 + ρβˆ
i
1(α
i
1β
i
2 − αi2βi1)](1− ρβi1)
> 0 (39)
Notice first that since P ic(1) < 0, a necessary condition for the occurrence
of local indeterminacy is
limλ→±∞ P ic(λ) = −∞ ⇔ T i12(k¯i, k¯i) < 0
This property is satisfied if and only if
αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1 > 1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2
1−αˆi1
αi1β
i
2
1−ρβi1
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Since the right-hand-side is an increasing function of ρ, we conclude that if
αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1 > (1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2)αi1βi2
(1−αˆi1)(1−βi1)
≡ Zi1 (40)
then T i12(k¯i, k¯i) < 0 for any ρ ∈ (0, 1). Taking (40) into account, local
indeterminacy may arise in two types of configurations:
i) when P ic(0) = T i21(k¯i, k¯i) > 0 and P ic(−1) < 0. In this case the
product of characteristic roots Dic = T i21(k¯i, k¯i)/ρT i12(k¯i, k¯i) is negative. We
immediately derive from (38):
P ic(0) > 0 ⇐ βˆi1 − αˆi1 > 0
P ic(−1) < 0 ⇔ αi1βi2 − αi2βi1 − α
i
2
ρ >
2(1−αˆi1−αˆi2)αi1βi2(1+βˆi1)
[2(1−αˆi1)−βˆi2](1−ρβi1)
(41)
Notice that βˆi1 − αˆi1 > 0 implies 2(1− αˆi1)− βˆi2 > 0. Moreover, (41) is never
satisfied when ρ is close to 0 while it will be satisfied when ρ is close to 1 if
αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1 > αi2 + 2(1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2)αi1βi2(1+βˆi1)
[2(1−αˆi1)−βˆi2](1−βi1)
≡ Zi2 (42)
Therefore, there exists ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that P ic(−1) < 0 for any ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1).
The rest of the proof is completed by noticing from (40) and (42) that
Zi2 > Zi1.
ii) when P ic(0) = T i21(k¯i, k¯i) < 0, P ic(−1) < 0 and Dic ∈ (0, 1). Under
(40) indeed, P ic(0) < 0 implies Dic > 0. We first derive from (38):
P ic(0) < 0 ⇔ αˆi1 − βˆi1 > (1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2)βˆi1αi1βi2ρ
αi2(1−ρβi1)
> 0
Since the right-hand-side is an increasing function of ρ, we conclude that if
αˆi1 − βˆi1 > (1−αˆ
i
1−αˆi2)βˆi1αi1βi2
αi2(1−βi1)
≡ Zi3 (43)
then P ic(0) < 0 for any ρ ∈ (0, 1). Notice then that 2(1 − αˆi1) − βˆi2 =
1− αˆi1 − (αˆi1 − βˆi1). It follows that if (43) holds with 1− αˆi1 > αˆi1 − βˆi1, then
(41) is satisfied and under (42), there exists ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that P ic(−1) < 0
for any ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1). Finally, we derive from Lemma 6.2 and (40)
Dic < 1 ⇔ αi1βi2 − αi2βi1 > (αˆ
i
1−βˆi1)αi2(1−ρβi1)+ρ(1−αˆi1−αˆi2)βˆi2αi1βi2
ρ(1−αˆi1)(1−ρβi1)
When ρ = 1 this inequality becomes
αi1β
i
2 − αi2βi1 > (αˆ
i
1−βˆi1)αi2(1−βi1)+(1−αˆi1−αˆi2)βˆi2αi1βi2
(1−αˆi1)(1−βi1)
≡ Zi4 (44)
Under (44), there exists ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that Dic < 1 for any ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1). The
rest of the proof follows from the fact that if (43) holds with 1−αˆi1 > αˆi1−βˆi1,
then Zi2 > Zi4.
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6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We follow the same procedure as in Nishimura and Yano [11]. We start by
stating without proof a standard Lemma which shows that an equilibrium
consumption path of a country is associated with a marginal utility of wealth.
Lemma 6.3. If cit, t = 0, 1, . . ., is country i’s equilibrium consumption path
(either under free-trade or autarky), then there is λi > 0 such that
+∞∑
t=0
ρtu(cit)− λi
+∞∑
t=0
cit ≥
+∞∑
t=0
ρtu(ξit)− λi
+∞∑
t=0
ξit
for any ξit > 0, t = 0, 1, . . ..
From this Lemma we derive by setting ξiτ = c
i
τ for all τ 6= t that
ρtu(cit)− λicit ≥ ρtu(ξit)− λiξit (45)
This implies
ρt
[
u(cAt )
λA
+ u(c
B
t )
λB
]
− (cAt + cBt ) ≥ ρt
[
u(ξAt )
λA
+ u(ξ
B
t )
λB
]
− (ξAt + ξBt ) (46)
Now consider the social production function of country i, T i(kit, y
i
t, e
i
ct, e
i
yt),
as the value function of program (5). Taking into account (17), we neces-
sarily have for given externalities (eict, e
i
yt):
T i(kit, k
i
t+1, e
i
ct, e
i
yt)+pt+1k
i
t+1−ptkit ≥ T i(κit, κit+1, eict, eiyt)+pt+1κit+1−ptκit
for any feasible country i’s capital stocks (κit, κ
i
t+1).
9 Since by definition
TA(kAt , k
A
t+1, e
A
ct, e
A
yt) + T
B(kBt , k
B
t+1, e
B
ct, e
B
yt) = c
A
t + c
B
t and using (47)-(48),
this last inequality becomes
ρt
[
u(cAt )
λA
+ u(c
B
t )
λB
]
+ pt+1kt+1 − ptkt ≥ ρt
[
u(ξAt )
λA
+ u(ξ
B
t )
λB
]
+ pt+1κt+1 − ptκt
for any feasible total capital stocks (κt, κt+1) and any ξit > 0 such that
TA(κAt , κ
A
t+1, e
A
ct, e
A
yt)+T
B(κBt , κ
B
t+1, e
B
ct, e
B
yt) = ξ
A
t + ξ
B
t and where kt = k
A
t +
kBt .
10 Thus, by the definition of W (kt, yt, ect, eyt;λ) we get
ρtW (kt, kt+1, ect, eyt;λ) + pt+1kt+1 − ptkt
≥ ρtW (κt, κt+1, ect, eyt;λ) + pt+1κt+1 − ptκt
9Recall that yt ≤ Eiy(kit)β
i
1eiyt. A feasible path of country i’s capital stocks is thus a
pair (kit, k
i
t+1) such that 0 ≤ kit ≤ (Eiyeiyt)1/(1−β
i
1) and 0 ≤ kit+1 ≤ Eiy(kit)β
i
1eiyt.
10A feasible path of total capital stocks is a pair (kt, kt+1) such that kt = k
A
t + k
B
t and
kt+1 = k
A
t+1 + k
B
t+1, with (κ
i
t, κ
i
t+1) some feasible country i’s capital stocks, i = A,B.
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for any feasible total capital stocks (κt, κt+1). Under Assumption 1, this
last inequality implies that along a free-trade equilibrium we have p0 >
0. It follows from inequality (48) considered with u(ci) = ci that λA =
λB. The final result follows from the definitions of W (kt, yt, ect, eyt;λ) and
V (kt, yt, ect, eyt).
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
A steady state is a solution (kA, kB, yA, yB, k) of the following system
TA2 (k
A, yA, eˆAc , eˆ
A
y ) + ρT
A
1 (k
A, yA, eˆAc , eˆ
A
y ) = 0 (47)
TB2 (k
B, yB, eˆBc , eˆ
B
y ) + ρT
B
1 (k
B, yB, eˆBc , eˆ
B
y ) = 0 (48)
TA1 (k
A, yA, eˆAc , eˆ
A
y )− TB1 (kB, yB, eˆBc , eˆBy ) = 0 (49)
TA2 (k
A, yA, eˆAc , eˆ
A
y )− TB2 (kB, yB, eˆBc , eˆBy ) = 0 (50)
kA + kB = yA + yB = k (51)
with cA+cB = V (k, k, eˆc, eˆy) = TA(kA, kA, eˆAc , eˆ
A
y )+T
B(kB, kB, eˆBc , eˆ
B
y ) and
eˆic = eˆ
i
c(k
i, yi), eˆiy = eˆ
i
y(k
i, yi), i = A,B. We get from equations (47)-(48)
the following property for a steady state under free-trade:
Lemma 6.4. At a steady state under free-trade, the following holds:
gA
yAβA1
= g
B
yBβB1
= ρ
with gi ≡ Ki∗y the stationary optimal demand for capital in the investment
good sector of country i = A,B.
Proof : The first order conditions (49)-(50) give TAj (k
A, yA, eAc , e
A
y ) =
TBj (k
B, yB, eBc , e
B
y ), j = 1, 2. As T
i
2(k
i, yi, eic, e
i
y) = −T i1(ki, yi, eic, eiy)gi/yiβi1,
we derive that gA/yAβA1 = g
B/yBβB1 . Consider now the equations (47)-(48).
We get −T i2(ki, yi, eic, eiy) = ρT i1(ki, yi, eic, eiy) and the result follows.
We may now prove Proposition 4. Using Lemmas 6.4 and 6.1 with (34),
equations (47) and (48) may be written as
1
βA1
(
αA2 β
A
1 k
A+(αA1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1 yA
αA1 β
A
2
)βˆA2
= 1
βB1
(
αB2 β
B
1 k
B+(αB1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 yB
αB1 β
B
2
)βˆB2
= ρ
It follows that the autarky steady state, i.e. kA = yA = k¯A and kB = yB =
k¯B, with k¯i given in Proposition 1, is a solution of the previous equations
and satisfies equation (51). Considering T i1(k
i, yi, eic, e
i
y) in Lemma 6.1 with
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EAy = EBc = EBy = 1 and (34), equation (49) with ki = yi = k¯i is satisfied if
and only if EAc = E¯Ac with
E¯Ac = [
αA2 β
A
1 +(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1 ]
αˆA2 αB1 (α
B
2 β
B
1 )
αˆB2 (k¯B)αˆ
B
1 −1(1−ρβB1 )αˆ
B
1 +αˆ
B
2 −1
αA1 (α
A
2 β
A
1 )
αˆA
2 (k¯A)
αˆA
1
−1
(1−ρβA1 )
αˆA
1
+αˆA
2
−1[αB2 βB1 +(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 ]
αˆB
2
(52)
Then, since from (47) and (48) we have T i1(k
i, yi, eˆic, eˆ
i
y) = T
i
2(k
i, yi, eˆic, eˆ
i
y)/ρ,
i = A,B, equation (50) also holds with ki = yi = k¯i.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider equations (47)-(51) with eˆic = eˆ
i
c(k
i, yi) and eˆiy = eˆ
i
y(k
i, yi), i =
A,B. We know from Lemma 6.4 that equations (47) and (48) imply gi =
ρβi1y
i, i = A,B. Assume then that kA = θyA and kB = yB/θ with θ >
1 some constant. We will give conditions on the normalization constants
E ic, E iy to get these expressions as solutions of equations (47)-(51). Notice
first from (51) that these restrictions imply kA = θkB and gA = ρβA1 k
A/θ,
gB = ρβB1 k
Bθ. Substituting these expressions into (36) with Kiy = g
i and
solving for ki, i = A,B, gives
kA∗ = θα
A
1 β
A
2 (EAy ρβA1 )1/βˆ
A
2
αA2 β
A
1 θ+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1
, kB∗ = α
B
1 β
B
2 (EBy ρβB1 )1/βˆ
B
2
αB2 β
B
1 +(α
B
1 β
B
2 −αB2 βA1 )ρβB1 θ
(53)
We may now use the normalization constants EAy and EBy to get kA∗ = θkB∗.
Assuming EBy = 1 we derive from (53) that kA∗ = θkB∗ if and only if
θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ) and EAy = EA∗y with
EA∗y = 1ρβA1
{
[αA2 βA1 θ+(αA1 βA2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1 ]αB1 βB2 (ρβB1 )1/βˆ
B
2
αA1 β
A
2 [αB2 βB1 +(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βA1 )ρβB1 θ]
}βˆA2
(54)
Considering T i1(k
i, yi, eic, e
i
y) in Lemma 6.1 with EBc = 1 and (34), equation
(49) with kA = θyA, kB = yB/θ, and thus kA = θkB, is satisfied if and only
if θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ) and EAc = EA∗c with
EA∗c = [
αA2 β
A
1 θ+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1 ]
αˆA2 αB1 (α
B
2 β
B
1 )
αˆB2 (1−ρβB1 θ)αˆ
B
1 +αˆ
B
2 −1(kB∗)αˆ
B
1 −αˆ
A
1
αA1 (α
A
2 β
A
1 )
αˆA
2 (θ−ρβA1 )
αˆA
1
+αˆA
2
−1[αB2 βB1 +(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 θ]
αˆB
2
(55)
Then, since from (47) and (48) we have T i1(k
i, yi, eˆic, eˆ
i
y) = T
i
2(k
i, yi, eˆic, eˆ
i
y)/ρ,
i = A,B, equation (50) also holds with kA = θyA and kB = yB/θ.
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6.6 Proof of Corollary 1
To simplify notation let
ΦAθ = α
A
2 β
A
1 θ + (α
A
1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 )ρβA1 , ΦBθ = αB2 βB1 + (αB1 βB2 − αB2 βA1 )ρβB1 θ
Let EBc = EBy = 1 and EA∗c , EA∗y be given by (54) and (55). Substituting
these values into the free-trade distribution of capital as given by (20) gives
kA∗ = θα
B
1 β
B
2 (ρβ
B
1 )
1/βˆB2
ΦB
θ
= θkB∗ (56)
We may then rewrite EA∗c as follows
EA∗c = (
ΦAθ )
αˆA2 αB1 (α
B
2 β
B
1 )
αˆB2 (1−ρβB1 θ)αˆ
B
1 +αˆ
B
2 −1
αA1 (α
A
2 β
A
1 )
αˆA
2 (θ−ρβA1 )
αˆA
1
+αˆA
2
−1(ΦBθ )
αˆB
2
(
αB1 β
B
2 (ρβ
B
1 )
1/βˆB2
ΦB
θ
)αˆB1 −αˆA1
(57)
Considering T i(ki, yi, eic, e
i
y) as defined by (7) with (28), (30), (34), EBc = 1,
kA = θyA, kB = yB/θ, (56) and (57), we get
TA∗ = α
B
1 (θ−ρβA1 )
αA1 (1−ρβB1 θ)
(αB1 β
B
2 )
αˆA1 (αB2 β
B
1 )
αˆB2 (ρβB1 )
αˆB1 /βˆ
B
2 (1−ρβB1 θ)αˆ
B
1 +αˆ
B
2
(ΦB
θ
)
αˆB
1
+αˆB
2
= α
B
1 (θ−ρβA1 )
αA1 (1−ρβB1 θ)
TB∗ ≡ ηTB∗
(58)
6.7 Proof of Proposition 6
We first compute the partial derivatives Vmn(k, y). Simple modifications of
the proof of Lemma 7 from Nishimura and Yano [11] allows to get
Lemma 6.5. Along a free-trade equilibrium, the partial derivatives
Vmn(k, y) satisfy the following:
V11(k, y) = 1Θ
[
T A11(kA, yA)|HB(kB, yB)|+ T B11 (kB, yB)|HA(kA, yA)|
]
V12(k, y) = 1Θ
[
T A12(kA, yA)|HB(kB, yB)|+ T B12 (kB, yB)|HA(kA, yA)|
]
V21(k, y) = 1Θ
[
T A21(kA, yA)|HB(kB, yB)|+ T B21 (kB, yB)|HA(kA, yA)|
]
V22(k, y) = 1Θ
[
T A22(kA, yA)|HB(kB, yB)|+ T B22 (kB, yB)|HA(kA, yA)|
]
where T imn(ki, yi), |H i(ki, yi)| are given in Lemma 6.2 and
Θ = T A11(kA, yA)T B22 (kB, yB) + T B11 (kB, yB)T A22(kA, yA)
− T A12(kA, yA)T B21 (kB, yB)− T A21(kA, yA)T B12 (kB, yB)
+ |HA(kA, yA)|+ |HB(kB, yB)| 6= 0
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From Lemmas 6.2 and 6.5 we may then derive:
Lemma 6.6. The partial derivatives Vmn(k, y) are given by:
V11(k,y)
C = V¯11(k, y)
= −
{
(1− αˆA1 )(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βA1 βB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1 αA2 (kA − gA)
+(1− αˆB1 )(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA1 βB1 βA2 βˆA2 αA1 αB2 (kB − gB)
+(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )αA1 βA2 αB1 βB2 (βB1 βˆA1 βˆB2 gA + βA1 βˆB1 βˆA2 gB)
V12(k,y)
C = V¯12(k, y)
= −ρβA1 βB1
{
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )(αA1 βA2 − αA2 βA1 )βB2 βˆB2 αB1 [αˆA2 kA − (1− αˆA1 )gA]
+(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )(αB1 βB2 − αB2 βB1 )βA2 βˆA2 αA1 [αˆB2 kB − (1− αˆB1 )gB]
−(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )(βB2 βˆB2 αB1 αA2 βA1 kA + βA2 βˆA2 αA1 αB2 βB1 kB)
}
V21(k,y)
C = V¯21(k, y)
= ρ
{
(βˆA1 − αˆA1 )(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1 αA2 βA1 (kA − gA)
+(βˆB1 − αˆB1 )(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA1 βA2 βˆA2 αA1 αB2 βB1 (kB − gB)
+(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )αA1 βA2 αB1 βB2 (βB1 βˆA1 βˆB2 gA + βA1 βˆB1 βˆA2 gB)
}
V22(k,y)
C = V¯22(k, y)
= ρ2βA1 β
B
1
{
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )(αA1 βA2 − αA2 βA1 )βB2 βˆB2 αB1 [(αˆA2 − βˆA2 )kA − (βˆA1 − αˆA1 )gA]
+(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )(αB1 βB2 − αB2 βB1 )βA2 βˆA2 αA1 [(αˆB2 − βˆB2 )kB − (βˆB1 − αˆB1 )gB]
−(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )(βB2 βˆB2 αB1 αA2 βA1 kA + βA2 βˆA2 αA1 αB2 βB1 kB)
}
with
C = TA1 (kA,yA)3ρ2
Θ(kA−gA)(kB−gB)
1
αA2 β
A
1 k
A+βˆA1 (α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )gA
1
αB2 β
B
1 k
B+βˆB1 (α
B
1 β
B
2 −αA2 βB1 )gB
and gi = ρβi1y
i, i = A,B, k = kA + kB, y = yA + yB.
Proof : The expressions of the partial derivatives Vmn(k, y) follow from
Lemmas 6.2, 6.4, 6.5 and the fact that at a steady state under free-trade
we have TA2 (k
A, yA, eAc , e
A
y ) + ρT
A
1 (k
A, yA, eAc , e
A
y ) = T
B
2 (k
B, yB, eBc , e
B
y ) +
ρTB1 (k
B, yB, eBc , e
B
y ) = 0 and that T
A
j (k
A, yA, eAc , e
A
y ) = T
B
j (k
B, yB, eBc , e
B
y ),
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j = 1, 2.
The characteristic polynomial as defined by (6.7) then becomes:
Po(λ)
C ≡ P¯o(λ) = ρV¯12(k∗, k∗)λ2 + λ
[
V¯22(k∗, k∗) + ρV¯11(k∗, k∗)
]
+ V¯21(k∗, k∗) = 0
The stability analysis is based on the sign of P¯o(0), P¯o(1) and P¯o(−1). The
following property holds for the autarky and free-trade distributions:
Lemma 6.7. Along a steady state k∗ = kA∗ + kB∗, the characteristic poly-
nomial satisfies P¯o(1) < 0.
Proof : Consider the partial derivatives V¯mn(k, y) given in Lemma 6.6 with
Lemma 6.4. Straightforward computations give after simplifications:
P¯o(1) = −ρβˆA2 βˆB2 βA1 βB1
{
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )αB1 βB2 (kA − gA)
[
αA2 + ρ(α
A
1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 )
]
+ (1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 (kB − gB)
[
αB2 + ρ(α
B
1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 )
]}
The result derives from the following two facts: firstly, at the autarky dis-
tribution we have ki − gi = k¯i(1 − ρβi1) > 0, and secondly, at the free-
trade distribution we have kA − gA = kA∗(θ − ρβA1 ) > 0 and kB − gB =
kB∗(1− ρβB1 θ) > 0 since θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ).
We may now prove Proposition 6. Using Lemma 6.6, straightforward
computations show that:
P¯o(0) = V¯21(k, y)
P¯o(−1) = ρ(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1
{
2ρ(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )αA2 (βA1 )2kA
− ρβA1 (αA1 βA2 − αA2 βA1 )
[
(2αˆA2 − βˆA2 )kA − [2(1− αˆA1 )− βˆA2 ]gA
]
+ [2(1− αˆA1 )− βˆA2 ]αA2 βA1 (kA − gA) + 2(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βˆA1 αA1 βA2 gA
}
+ ρ(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA1 βA2 βˆA2 αA1
{
2ρ(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )αB2 (βB1 )2kB
− ρβB1 (αB1 βB2 − αB2 βB1 )
[
(2αˆB2 − βˆB2 )kB − [2(1− αˆB1 )− βˆB2 ]gB
]
+ [2(1− αˆB1 )− βˆB2 ]αB2 βB1 (kB − gB) + 2(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βˆB1 αB1 βB2 gB
}
Consider the expressions of P¯o(0) and P¯o(−1) along the autarky steady state
with EAy = EBy = EBc = 1, EAc = E¯Ac , gi = ρβi1yi and ki = yi = k¯i. Taking
(38) and (39) into account, we find after simplifications
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P¯o(0) = ρ(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βA1 βB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1 k¯AP
A
c (0)
AA
+ ρ(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA1 βB1 βA2 βˆA2 αA1 k¯B P
B
c (0)
AB
P¯o(−1) = ρ(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βA1 βB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1 k¯AP
A
c (−1)
AA
+ ρ(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA1 βB1 βA2 βˆA2 αA1 k¯B P
B
c (−1)
AB
We also get from Lemma 6.6
V¯12(k¯, k¯) = ρβA1 βB1
{
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βB2 βˆB2 αB1 k¯A
[
(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )αA1 βA2
− (αA1 βA2 − αA2 βA1 )(1− αˆA1 )(1− ρβA1 )
]
+ (1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA2 βˆA2 αA1 k¯B
[
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB1 )αB1 βB2
− (αB1 βB2 − αB2 βB1 )(1− αˆB1 )(1− ρβB1 )
]}
The results follow from the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition
2.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the free-trade distribution k = kA + kB as defined by Proposition
5 with with EBc = EBy = 1, EAc = EA∗c , EAy = EA∗y and θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβ1).
It follows that gA = ρβA1 k
B, kA − gA = kB(θ − ρβA1 ), gB = ρβB1 θkB,
kB − gB = kB(1− ρβB1 θ). Using Lemma 6.6, Straightforward computations
give after simplifications:
V¯12(k, k) = ρβA1 βB1 kB
{
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βB2 βˆB2 αB1
[
(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 θ
− (αA1 βA2 − αA2 βA1 )(1− αˆA1 )(θ − ρβA1 )
]
+ (1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA2 βˆA2 αA1
[
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB1 )αB1 βB2
− (αB1 βB2 − αB2 βB1 )(1− αˆB1 )(1− ρβB1 θ)
]}
P¯o(0) = ρβA1 βB1 kB
{
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βB2 βˆB2 αB1
[
(βˆA1 − αˆA1 )αA2 (θ − ρβA1 )
+ (1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 βˆA1 ρ
]
+ (1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA2 βˆA2 αA1
[
(βˆB1 − αˆB1 )αB2 (1− ρβB1 θ)
+ (1− αˆB1 − αˆB1 )αB1 βB2 βˆB1 ρθ
]
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P¯o(−1) = ρ(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1 βA1 kA
{
2ρ(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 θ(1 + βˆA1 )
+ [2(1− αˆA1 )− βˆA2 ](θ − ρβA1 )
[
αA2 − ρ(αA1 βA2 − αA2 βA1 )
]}
+ ρ(1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA1 βA2 βˆA2 αA1 βB1 kB
{
2ρ(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )αB1 βB2 (1 + θβˆB1 )
+ [2(1− αˆB1 )− βˆB2 ](1− ρβB1 θ)
[
αB2 − ρ(αB1 βB2 − αB2 βB1 )
]}
From Lemma 6.7 we derive that a necessary condition for the occurrence of
local indeterminacy is
limλ→±∞ P¯o(λ) = −∞ ⇔ V¯12(k, k) < 0
This property is satisfied for any ρ ∈ (0, 1) if
αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > 1−αˆ
A
1 −αˆA2
1−αˆA1
αA1 β
A
2 θ
θ−βA1
≡ ZA5 (59)
and
αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 > 1−αˆ
B
1 −αˆB2
1−αˆB1
αB1 β
B
2
1−θβB1
≡ ZB5 (60)
Under these conditions, local indeterminacy may arise in two types of con-
figurations:
i) when P¯o(0) > 0 and P¯o(−1) < 0. In this case the product of charac-
teristic roots Do = V¯21(k, k)/ρV¯12(k, k) is negative. We immediately derive
that P¯o(0) > 0 for any ρ ∈ (0, 1) if
βˆA1 − αˆA1 > 0 and βˆB1 − αˆB1 > 0
Notice then that βˆi1− αˆi1 > 0 implies 2(1− αˆi1)− βˆi2 > 0. Hence, there exists
ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that P¯o(−1) < 0 for any ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1) if
αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > αA2 + 2(1−αˆ
A
1 −αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 θ(1+βˆA1 )
[2(1−αˆA1 )−βˆA2 ](θ−βA1 )
≡ ZA6 (61)
and
αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 > αB2 + 2(1−αˆ
B
1 −αˆB2 )αB1 βB2 (1+θβˆB1 )
[2(1−αˆB1 )−βˆB2 ](1−θβB1 )
≡ ZB6 (62)
The rest of the proof is completed by noticing from (59)-(62) that ZA6 > ZA5
and ZB6 > ZB5 .
ii) when P¯o(0) < 0, P¯o(−1) < 0 and Do ∈ (0, 1). Under (59)-(60), we
know indeed that Po(0) < 0 implies Do > 0. We first derive that P¯o(0) < 0
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1) if:
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αˆA1 − βˆA1 > (1−αˆ
A
1 −αˆA2 )βˆA1 αA1 βA2
αA2 (θ−βA1 )
≡ ZA7 (63)
and
αˆB1 − βˆB1 > (1−αˆ
B
1 −αˆB2 )βˆB1 αB1 βB2 θ
αB2 (1−θβB1 )
≡ ZB7 (64)
Notice then that 2(1− αˆi1)− βˆi2 = 1− αˆi1− (αˆi1− βˆi1). It follows that if (63)-
(64) hold with 1− αˆA1 > αˆA1 − βˆA1 and 1− αˆB1 > αˆB1 − βˆB1 , then (61)-(62) are
satisfied and under (59)-(60), there exists ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that P¯o(−1) < 0
for any ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1). Finally, when ρ = 1, we derive that Do < 1 if
(1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )βB2 βˆB2 αB1
[
(αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 )(1− αˆA1 )(θ − βA1 )
+ (βˆA1 − αˆA1 )αA2 (θ − βA1 ) + (1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 (βˆA1 − θ)
]
+ (1− αˆA1 − αˆA2 )βA2 βˆA2 αA1
[
(αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 )(1− αˆB1 )(1− βB1 θ)
+ (βˆB1 − αˆB1 )αB2 (1− βB1 θ) + (1− αˆB1 − αˆB1 )αB1 βB2 (βˆB1 θ − 1)
]
> 0
This inequality holds if
αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > (αˆ
A
1 −βˆA1 )αA2 (θ−βA1 )+(1−αˆA1 −αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 (θ−βˆA1 )
(1−αˆA1 )(θ−βA1 )
≡ ZA8 (65)
and
αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 > (αˆ
B
1 −βˆB1 )αB2 (1−θβB1 )+(1−αˆB1 −αˆB2 )αB1 βB2 (1−θβˆB1 )
(1−αˆB1 )(1−θβB1 )
≡ ZB8 (66)
Under (65)-(66), there exists ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that Do < 1 for any ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1).
The rest of the proof follows from the fact that if (63)-(64) hold with 1−αˆA1 >
αˆA1 − βˆA1 and 1− αˆB1 > αˆB1 − βˆB1 , then ZA6 > ZA8 and ZB6 > ZB8 .
6.9 Proof of Corollary 2
In the proof of Proposition 2, assume that inequality (42) applied to country
A is not satisfied, i.e.
αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 < αA2 + 2(1−αˆ
A
1 −αˆA2 )αA1 βA2 (1+βˆA1 )
[2(1−αˆA1 )−βˆA2 ](1−βA1 )
≡ ZA2
It follows that the autarky steady state of country A is saddle-point stable
since PAc (−1) > 0 and PAc (1) < 0. Consider then condition (62) in the proof
of Proposition 7. Straightforward computations give ZA2 > ZA6 . It follows
that all the conditions of Proposition 7 for country A may be satisfied for
the free-trade steady state while the steady state under autarky is locally
determinate. At the same time, we get for country B that ZB5 > ZB1 ,
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ZB6 > ZB2 , ZB7 > ZB3 and ZB8 < ZB4 . Since, as shown in the proof of
Proposition 2, ZB2 > ZB4 , it follows that if all the conditions of Proposition
7 for country B are satisfied along the free-trade steady state then the
steady state under autarky is also locally indeterminate. As a result local
indeterminacy arises at the world level while country A is locally determinate
under autarky.
6.10 Proof of Proposition 8
Assume that αˆA1 + αˆ
A
2 = 1. We get
V¯12(k, k) = −ρβA1 βB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1 αˆA2 (1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )(αA1 βA2 − αA2 βA1 )(kA − gA)
P¯o(0) = ρβB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1 αA2 βA1 (1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )(βˆA1 − αˆA1 )(kA − gA)
P¯o(−1) = −ρβA1 βB1 βB2 βˆB2 αB1 (1− αˆB1 − αˆB2 )(2αˆA2 − βˆA2 )(kA − gA)
×
[
ρ(αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 )− αA2
]
Do = V¯21(k,k)ρV¯12(k,k) =
(αˆA1 −βˆA1 )αA2
ραˆA2 (α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )
As shown in the proof of Lemma 6.7, along the autarky or free-trade distri-
bution, as defined by Propositions 4 and 5, the differences ki− gi, i = A,B,
are always positive. Since P¯o(1) < 0, a necessary condition for the occur-
rence of local indeterminacy is
limλ→±∞ P¯o(λ) = −∞ ⇔ V¯12(k, k) < 0
This property is satisfied for any ρ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if the consumption
good of country A is capital intensive at the private level. Local indetermi-
nacy then arises in two types of configurations:
i) when P¯o(0) > 0 and P¯o(−1) < 0. In this case the product of char-
acteristic roots Do is negative. If the consumption good of country A is
labor intensive at the social level, i.e. βˆA1 − αˆA1 > 0, then P¯o(0) > 0 for any
ρ ∈ (0, 1). Notice also that βˆA1 − αˆA1 > 0 implies 2αˆA2 − βˆA2 > 0. Consider
finally P¯o(−1). When ρ is close to zero P¯o(−1) > 0 but when ρ is close to
1, P¯o(−1) < 0 if and only if
αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > αA2 (67)
ii) when P¯o(0) < 0, P¯c(−1) < 0 and Dc ∈ (0, 1). We immediately get
that P¯o(0) < 0 if and only if the consumption good is capital intensive at
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the social level, i.e. αˆA1 − βˆA1 > 0. Moreover under (67), P¯o(−1) < 0 if
2αˆA2 − βˆA2 > 0 or equivalently
0 < αˆA1 − βˆA1 < αˆA2 (68)
Therefore, under (67) and (68), there exists ρ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that P¯o(−1) < 0
and Do ∈ (0, 1) for any ρ ∈ (ρ∗, 1).
Now denote ic = 1−αi1−αi2. By continuity, there exists  > 0 such that
all these results are preserved for any Ac ∈ [0, ).
6.11 Proof of Proposition 9
Consider the autarky steady state (20) with EBc = EBy = 1, EA∗c , EA∗y as given
by (54), (57) and η as defined by (58). Using (28)-(31), the corresponding
amount of stationary consumption is
c¯A =
(
(1−ρβA1 )ΦAθ
(θ−ρβA1 )ΦA1
)αˆA1 +αˆA2
ηTB∗, c¯B =
(
(1−ρβB1 )ΦBθ
(θ−ρβB1 )ΦB1
)αˆB1 +αˆB2
TB∗
We then derive from Corollary 1:
c¯A − cA∗ = TB∗
[(
(1−ρβA1 )ΦAθ
(θ−ρβA1 )ΦA1
)αˆA1 +αˆA2
η − 1
]
= T
B∗
1−ρβB1 θ
[(
(1−ρβA1 )ΦAθ
(θ−ρβA1 )ΦA1
)αˆA1 +αˆA2 αB1 (θ−ρβA1 )
αA1
− (1− ρβB1 θ)
]
c¯B − cB∗ = TB∗
[(
(1−ρβB1 )ΦBθ
(1−ρβB1 θ)ΦB1
)αˆB1 +αˆB2 − η]
= T
B∗
(1−ρβB1 θ)
αˆB
1
+αˆB
2
[(
(1−ρβB1 )ΦBθ
ΦB1
)αˆB1 +αˆB2 − αB1 (θ−ρβA1 )
αA1 (1−ρβB1 θ)
1−αˆB
1
−αˆB
2
]
with
TB∗
1−ρβB1 θ
= (α
B
1 β
B
2 )
αˆA1 (αB2 β
B
1 )
αˆB2 (ρβB1 )
αˆB1 /βˆ
B
2 (1−ρβB1 θ)αˆ
B
1 +αˆ
B
2 −1
(ΦB
θ
)
αˆB
1
+αˆB
2
TB∗
(1−ρβB1 θ)
αˆB
1
+αˆB
2
= (α
B
1 β
B
2 )
αˆA1 (αB2 β
B
1 )
αˆB2 (ρβB1 )
αˆB1 /βˆ
B
2
(ΦB
θ
)
αˆB
1
+αˆB
2
Moreover, denoting by W¯ ≡ c¯A + c¯B and W∗ ≡ cA∗ + cB∗ respectively the
welfare at the world level under autarky and under free-trade, we get using
(58):
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W¯ −W∗ = TB∗
(1−ρβB1 θ)
αˆB
1
+αˆB
2
[(
(1−ρβB1 )ΦBθ
ΦB1
)αˆB1 +αˆB2 − (1− ρβB1 θ)αˆB1 +αˆB2
]
×
1− αB1 (θ−ρβA1 )αA1 (1−ρβB1 θ)1−αˆB1 −αˆB2
1−
(
(1−ρβA1 )Φ
A
θ
(θ−ρβA
1
)ΦA
1
)αˆA1 +αˆA2
(
(1−ρβB
1
)ΦB
θ
ΦB
1
)αˆB
1
+αˆB
2
−(1−ρβB1 θ)
αˆB
1
+αˆB
2

Notice then that since θ > 1, we get
(1−ρβA1 )ΦAθ
(θ−ρβA1 )ΦA1
< 1, (1−ρβ
B
1 )Φ
B
θ
(1−ρβB1 θ)ΦB1
> 1
We derive from all this that
lim
θ→1/ρβB1
c¯A − cA∗ = +∞, lim
θ→1/ρβB1
c¯B − cB∗ = −∞, lim
θ→1/ρβB1
W¯ −W∗ = −∞
The result follows.
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